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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #3067-81/1
21 May 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence


THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa (U)

1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your information. (U)

2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on 19 May 1981 with the NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you. (U)



L. Gray Cowan

Attachment
NFAC #3067-81

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WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA*

MAURITANIA

Analysts felt that the most recent developments in Mauritania were on the whole favorable to Western interests. The new military regime appears more moderate than its civilian predecessor; but the new government is still shaky, and continued instability is likely. The new regime does not have strong Libyan sympathies and appears to wish to be "truly neutral" on the Western Saharan/Polisario question. Indeed, President Qadhafi's sudden trip to Mauritania last month seems to have had the effect of convincing the military to oust the civilian government who, in the military's view, were opening the door to further Libyan influence in Mauritania. (S)

UGANDA

The critical period for internal stability in Uganda will come with the departure of Tanzanian troops in late June. Analysts were in complete agreement that the internal situation is in a state of total confusion but that overall Obote's position is weakening. It is possible that he will call in support from the Cubans and Soviets if he fails to win Western assistance. The Libyans have promised to fund some of the opposition parties, but it is not yet clear which of the parties is being favored by the Libyans. It is highly unlikely that Cuban troops could be transferred to Ethiopia to support Obote or a successor government. Any foreign assistance would have extreme logistical problems if it were not possible to resupply them through Kenya. (S)

CHAD

Analysts felt that another round of major fighting is in the making in Chad and that a dramatic realignment of the internal factions is possible. There was some feeling that we should be thinking about the question of dejure southern secession. Over the next three months there will be a continued deterioration of the Chadian government, and the Libyans may well act to replace Goukouni with Acyl Ahmet. Analysts felt that there was little prospect of Libyan withdrawal, although Qadhafi may make gestures in this direction in order to bolster his candidacy at this year's summit in Nairobi for the presidency of the OAU when Kenyan President Moi's term of office expires next year. (S)

* This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously, many of these developments will not occur in the time frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.

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EFFECTS OF THE FRENCH ELECTION ON AFRICA

Analysts felt that over the next three months the election of Mitterrand might give new directions to African political developments. Qadhafi may see the election as a test of wills by the French of Libyan objectives and may make moves into Niger or into southern Chad to find out what the reaction of the new French government may be. The defeat of Giscard calls into question French support for Mobutu and may heighten Mobutu's insecurity over his relationship with his immediate neighbors. (S)

OAU MEETING IN NAIROBI

Analysts felt that the forthcoming OAU meeting may seriously affect US interests in Africa. It is likely to be a stormy meeting, particularly if the question of Chad and recognition of the Polisario become central issues. If, as some analysts expect, the major thrust will be an attack on the US over perceived changes in American policy towards South Africa and Namibia and repeal of the Clark Amendment, the US may be subjected to severe attack. (S)

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

The feeling was expressed that the present Dacko regime in the Central African Republic will not last much longer. Increasing labor unrest and attacks on Europeans are increasing, and the French appear to be unwilling to exert force to expel internal disturbances. (S)

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